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The Objective Bayesian 
Conceptualisation of Proof 




The objective Bayesian view of proof (or logical probability, or 
evidential support) is explained and defended: that the relation of 
evidence to hypothesis (in legal trials, science etc) is a strictly 
logical one, comparable to deductive logic. This view is 
distinguished from the thesis, which had some popularity in law in 
the 1980s, that legal evidence ought to be evaluated using 
numerical probabilities and formulas. While numbers are not 
always useful, a central role is played in uncertain reasoning by the 
‘proportional syllogism’, or argument from frequencies, such as 
‘nearly all aeroplane flights arrive safely, so my flight is very 
likely to arrive safely’. Such arguments raise the ‘problem of the 
reference class’, arising from the fact that an individual case may 
be a member of many different classes in which frequencies differ. 
For example, if 15 per cent of swans are black and 60 per cent of 
fauna in the zoo is black, what should I think about the likelihood 
of a swan in the zoo being black? The nature of the problem is 
explained, and legal cases where it arises are given. It is explained 
how recent work in data mining on the relevance of features for 
prediction provides a solution to the reference class problem. 
I Introduction: Bayesianism, Law and the 
Nature of Evidence 
The encounter between Bayesian theory of probability and the law 
has been an unhappy one. The debate in the legal world in the 1980s 
and 1990s on Bayesianism and the law focused on cases like Adams1
                                                        
*   Professor, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of New South 
Wales. 
 
where excitable counsel urged jurors to pluck numerical prior 
probabilities of guilt out of the air and to literally apply a numerical 
version of Bayes’ theorem to update them. Bayesianism was 
1  R v Denis Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 and R v Denis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr 
App R 377. 
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presented to lawyers as essentially a matter of using formulas with 
numbers in the way statisticians do.2 A great number of reasons have 
been advanced as to why it is not a good idea to do that, including the 
impossibility of reliably eliciting any such priors and the 
computational infeasibility of calculating with them.3 Those reasons 
are sound.4
Nevertheless Bayesianism has something fundamental to 
contribute to the law of evidence. It has two main points to make: first, 
to advance a view on what evidence is, and second, to recommend two 
main forms of inference, the confirmation of theories by their 
consequences, and the proportional syllogism. 
 
Its main aim is to supply a theory of what evidence is. Evidence 
scholars ought to want to know what evidence is, for the same reason 
that ornithologists ought to want to know what birds are; and astrology 
ought to be concerned by claims that it is not about anything. 
Bayesianism has a story about what the subject-matter of evidence is — 
namely, logical relations between evidence and conclusion. It is of 
fundamental philosophical interest whether that is right — or if not, 
what alternative is right. And naturally, debates at the foundational 
level have consequences more widely, as we will see. 
The (objective) Bayesian theory of evidence (also known as the 
logical theory of probability)5 aims to explain what sort of thing 
evidence is. It holds that the relation of evidence to conclusion is a 
matter of strict logic, like the relation of axioms to theorems in 
mathematics but less conclusive. Given a fixed body of evidence — say 
in a trial, or in a dispute about a scientific theory — and given a 
conclusion, there is a fixed degree to which the evidence supports the 
conclusion.6                                                        
2  David H Kaye, ‘Introduction: What is Bayesianism?’ in Peter Tillers and Eric D 
Green (eds) Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence: The Uses and Limits 
of Bayesianism (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988) 1. 
 It says, for example, that if we could establish just what 
the standard of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ is, then, in a given 
3  Andrew Ligertwood and Gary Edmond, Australian Evidence (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 5th ed 2010) [1.28]–[1.34]; Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, 
Criminal Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2010) 153–63; Ronald J Allen, 
‘Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry’ (1997) 1 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 254; David Hodgson, ‘Probability: The 
Logic of the Law: A Response’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 51. 
4 Unlike those considerations that amount to ‘Wouldn’t it be awful if lawyers had to 
learn mathematics?’ 
5 Kaye, ‘Introduction: What is Bayesianism?’ above n 2, 4; fine distinctions 
considered in Darrell P Rowbottom, ‘On the Proximity of the Logical and ‘Objective 
Bayesian’ Interpretations of Probability’ (2008) 69 Erkenntnis 335. 
6  Introductions in James Franklin, What Science Knows: And How It Knows It 
(Encounter Books, 2009) 5–21; J Maynard Keynes, Treatise on Probability 
(Macmillan 1921); Edwin T Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003); a fuller defence in Jon Williamson, In Defence 
of Objective Bayesianism (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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trial, it is an objective matter of logical fact whether the evidence 
presented does or does not meet that standard, and so a jury is either 
right or wrong in its verdict on the evidence. Bayesianism thus provides 
an analysis of the notion of the concept ‘epistemic’ often used in the 
law of evidence, where epistemic purposes of evidentiary rules and 
practices are distinguished from non-epistemic (typically ethical) ones. 
That view contrasts with, for example: 
• Psychological views that deal only in people’s actual degrees 
of belief in propositions—objective Bayesians are keen to 
emphasise the difference between what people in fact believe 
and what they ought to believe; 
• Sociological views that people’s degrees of belief are 
socially constructed (solely) on the basis of power relations, 
patronage and so on; 
• ‘Subjective Bayesianism’, which allows one to have any 
degrees of belief one likes in propositions, provided the 
system is ‘consistent’, eg, that one’s degree of belief in not-p 
is 1 minus one’s degree of belief in p7 (subjective 
Bayesianism led the revival of Bayesian statistics around the 
1970s and 1980s, but Bayesianism has tended in a more 
objectivist direction since then);8
• Frequentism and propensity interpretations of probability, 
which believe that all probabilities are about relative 
frequencies (respectively physical propensities), and that 
there is no such thing as what one ought to believe on non-
conclusive evidence; and,  
 
In the legal context perhaps we should add: 
• ‘Know-nothingism’, the view that it is all too deep for words 
and that Anglo-American law, reliant as it has always been 
on the bluff good sense of the English yeomanry, should 
avoid delving too deeply into matters that might lead to such 
horrors as ontology and metaphysics. 
II Numerical or Non-Numerical Probabilities? 
It is not essential to the Bayesian perspective that the relation of 
evidence to conclusion should be given a precise number, nor that it                                                         
7 Bruno de Finetti, Theory of Probability (Wiley, 1974); John Earman, Bayes or Bust? 
(MIT Press, 1992). 
8   Stephen E Fienberg, ‘When did Bayesian Inference Become “Bayesian”?’ (2006) 1 
Bayesian Analysis 1; S James Press, Subjective and Objective Bayesian Statistics 
(Wiley 2003). 
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be possible to compute the logical relation between evidence and 
conclusion in typical cases. It is sufficient for objective Bayesianism 
that it is sometimes intuitively evident that some hypotheses, on some 
bodies of evidence, are highly likely, almost certain, or virtually 
impossible. 
The most central theses of Bayesianism do not concern numbers 
but are certain qualitative principles of evidence. The first is the 
simplest principle of logical probability, called by Polya ‘the 
fundamental inductive pattern’9
q is a (non-trivial) consequence of hypothesis p 
 (and the main content of the celebrated 
Bayes’ Theorem which gives Bayesianism its name). It is: 
q is found to be true 
So, p is more likely to be true than before 
(In short, ‘Theories are confirmed by their consequences 
or predictions.’) 
It is hard to begin reasoning about the world without a 
commitment to this principle, as can be seen by trying to imagine a 
tribe that did not believe in it, and thought instead that agreement 
between theory and observation was a reason for disbelieving the 
theory. (They guess there are bison in the river field and go there to 
hunt them. They find none. So they conclude they will probably find 
bison there tomorrow and the next day and they go there day after day 
with high hopes. You will need to imagine that tribe because you will 
not be meeting them. They are extinct.10
Many Bayesians do believe that there is in principle a number 
(between 0 and 1) expressing the (logical) probability P(h|e) of any 
given hypothesis h on any given body of evidence e; indeed, that might 
be called the most orthodox Bayesian position. But Keynes, whose 
Treatise on Probability of 1921
) 
11
                                                        
9  George Polya, Patterns of Plausible Inference (Princeton University Press, 2nd ed, 
1968) 4. The derivation of it from Bayes’ Theorem is as follows. Let h stand for 
hypothesis, e for evidence. Then by Bayes’ Theorem 
 first clearly expressed objective 
Bayesianism, believed it was impossible to give every probability a 
number; certainly, it seems both impossible and pointless to debate 
precise numbers for, say: 
 P(h|e) = P(e|h) × P(h) / P(e) 
 Now if the evidence e is a consequence of the hypothesis h, then P(e|h) = 1. So 
 P(h|e) = P(h) / P(e) 
 If e is non-trivial, that is, not known with certainty already, then P(e) < 1. So P(h|e) 
equals P(h) divided by a number less than 1. So P(h|e) > P(h), that is, the hypothesis 
is more probable on the evidence than it was before. 
10  Franklin, above n 6, 9. 
11   Keynes, above n 6. 
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P(Marilyn Monroe was murdered by the CIA | The moon 
is made of green cheese). 
There is no logical relation between ‘evidence’ and conclusion, 
so there is no point looking for a number to express it.12
One might toy with the idea of accepting some minimal 
objective notion of evidential relevance, while hoping to avoid taking 
on the full superstructure of Bayesian theorems. That is a vain hope — 
something like trying to accept mathematicians’ advice on the addition 
of single-digit numbers while avoiding their excessively complex 
procedures for adding double-digit numbers. Once one has accepted the 
confirmation of theories by their consequences, one will be hard put to 
avoid accepting the next theorem, Polya’s ‘verification of an 
improbable consequence’: 
 More 
generally, in situations where the evidence is as imprecise as in most 
legal cases, the positing of an in-principle precise number does no real 
theoretical work; for example, if it is clear on a large mass of evidence 
that guilt is almost certain but that a precise numerical probability, even 
if it existed, could not be computed, one is perforce really working with 
an imprecise probability. 
q is a (non-trivial) consequence of hypothesis p 
q is very improbable in itself 
q is found to be true 
So, p is much more likely to be true than before13
After agreeing to sufficiently many such intuitively plausible 
theorems, one is on a slippery slope to full-blooded objective 
Bayesianism. There will be little motivation for wishing to avoid the 
more complex theorems, whose acceptance will make one a true 
believer. 
 
III Why Believe in Objective Bayesianism? 
According to logicians, the core of deductive logic does not need to 
give reasons for belief in itself. To give reasons already supposes 
logic. There is no non-circular justification for modus ponens, say, or 
the other basic principles of deductive logic.14
 
 The core of logic, at 
least, is just necessarily true, self-justifying, and in simple cases 
obvious. That is no less true when the logic is probabilistic than it is 
in the deductive case. 
                                                        
12  James Franklin, ‘Resurrecting Logical Probability’ (2001) 55 Erkenntnis 277. 
13  Polya, above n 9, 8. 
14   Susan Haack, ‘The Justification of Deduction’ (1976) 85 Mind 112. 
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Further, everyone appears to accept probabilistic reasoning from 
(approximate) frequencies in ordinary life. The reason for being fairly 
relaxed as one’s plane takes off is just the knowledge that the vast 
majority of planes that take off land safely. That is to exhibit 
confidence in the proportional syllogism (of which more below): 
P(this flight will land safely | the vast majority of flights 
land safely) is high 
To call that a kind of ‘syllogism’, of course, is to draw attention 
to its parallel with the ordinary syllogism of deductive logic: 
If all flights land safely and this is a flight, then this will 
land safely 
Or in the language of probability, 
P(this flight will land safely | 100% of flights land safely) 
= 1 
Surely that parallel is a good one. Merely saying, as some 
people overtrained in deductive logic do, that logic ought to be 
restricted by definition to cases where the conclusion follows with 
certainty from the premises, is unhelpful, as it tries to do away with the 
cases at hand by verbal stipulation. 
A further reason for believing that the principles of probabilistic 
reasoning are logic — true in all possible worlds — is that they work 
perfectly well with evidence for and against conjectures in pure 
mathematics, such as the Riemann Hypothesis. But in mathematics, 
there are no contingent principles such as the ‘uniformity of nature’ that 
might be thought to be needed to underpin probabilistic reasoning. 
There is only the conjecture and the evidence for it, and the relation 
between them can be nothing but logical.15
IV What does Objective Bayesianism do for the 
Theory of Legal Evidence? 
  
By virtue of giving a foundational story on what evidence is, 
objective Bayesianism supplies an answer to attempts to undermine 
the credibility of the legal process on the basis of alternative, 
mistaken, views of the relation of evidence to conclusion — for 
example, views that the relation is ‘constructed’ by power relations. If 
mathematicians are faced with views such as that 2 + 2 = 4 is only 
true because of a patriarchal commitment to binary oppositions, it is 
water off a duck’s back to them because they understand the necessity 
of why 2 + 2 must be 4. Acquaintance with such a competing view                                                         
15  James Franklin, ‘Non-deductive Logic in Mathematics’ (1987) 38 British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science 1. 
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will merely increase mathematicians’ determination to act politically 
to outnumber educationists on syllabus committees. In our age of 
relativist currents, those defending the credibility of a system of 
evidence evaluation need a story as to why there is objectivity at the 
bottom of it. Ideally, a true story. 
That is not to say that the conclusion of the exercise is 
necessarily conservative. As with the theory of the objectivity of ethical 
rights, it may turn out that current practice is in some respects not in 
accordance with the objective rules. That was indeed the case with 
witness identification evidence, where it appeared that such evidence is 
objectively less credible than it was normally taken to be in courts, and 
steps were taken to increase courts’ awareness of the problem.16
The use of objective Bayesianism in setting or underpinning 
standards applies also to justifications of exclusionary rules of 
evidence. When the Evidence Act says:  
 Such 
concerns only provide a reason for reform if one has an objective 
conception of evidence like the Bayesian one, according to which there 
can be a mismatch between court practices of belief and what the court 
should, as a matter of objective fact, believe on the evidence. 
The court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the 
evidence might  
(a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or  
(b) be misleading or confusing17
or:  
 
In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit 
evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value 
is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant18
the Bayesian has a clear story about what it means. ‘Probative value’ 
is the logical degree to which the evidence really does support the 
conclusion, while ‘prejudice’, ‘misleading’ and ‘confusing’ are ways 
in which people’s degrees of belief might deviate from what they 
ought to be, on the evidence. The possibility of — indeed the 
persistent and predictable tendency towards — deviation between 
 
                                                        
16 Gary L Wells and Elizabeth A Olson, ‘Eyewitness Testimony’ (2003) 54 Annual 
Review of Psychology 277; Brian L Cutler and Steven D Penrod, Mistaken 
Identification: The Eyewitness, Psychology, and the Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). Note that the basic reason for doubting eyewitness identification 
evidence is a straightforward statistical syllogism: Many convictions on eyewitness 
evidence have turned out to be false (on DNA evidence etc), so eyewitness 
identification evidence is unreliable. 
17  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 135. 
18  Ibid s 137. 
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logic and psychology is the reason for having the exclusionary rule.19
Those considerations apply equally well to the reasoning of 
juries in actual trials, properly conducted under the exclusionary rules. 
Bayesianism is normative as to errors of reasoning, and suggests there 
is cause for concern if jurors, like other human evidence evaluators, are 
systematically flouting the laws of probability. The legal world does 
not normally report trials in sufficient detail to make it possible to 
decide if jurors are misevaluating evidence — even if there is a 
transcript of everything said in court, it does not reveal the sequence of 
jurors’ thought processes. Psychological research on mock jurors, 
however, suggests there are certain systematic violations of the logical 
principles of evidence evaluation. For example, Carlson and Russo 
reported that mock jurors interpret evidence so as ‘to support 
whichever verdict is tentatively favored as a trial 
progresses…distortion increased with juror confidence in whichever 
verdict was currently leading’.
 
It is hard to see an alternative theory of evidence substantially 
different from the Bayesian one making sense of that. 
20 That, or any other distortion that 
means that the verdict reached can depend on the order of presentation 
of the evidence, is contrary to logical principles. Bayesians have a 
standpoint to criticise it. Those who refer evidence evaluation to the 
unreconstructed wisdom of the ‘reasonable man’ will have more 
difficulty in explaining what is wrong with it.21
V Are Evidence Evaluators Getting it Right? 
 
There are certainly many questions as to whether naïve evidence 
evaluators, such as juries, judges, detectives, medical diagnosticians, 
political pundits and so on are evaluating evidence well. ‘Naïve’ here 
means not so much lacking in experience of making judgments on 
evidence, but lacking in training in statistical methods and the 
mathematics of Bayes’ theorem, and mostly lacking also in punitive 
feedback on the results of mistakes. There is a great deal of work 
showing that ‘naïve experts’, if that is the right term, make systematic 
errors in evaluating evidence, from Kahneman and Tversky’s classic 
psychological work of the 1970s22
                                                        
19  Supposing that protecting the jury from its tendencies to error is indeed the main 
reason for exclusionary rules: see debate in Lisa Dufraimont, ‘Evidence Law and the 
Jury: a Reassessment’, (2008) 53 McGill Law Journal 199.  
 to Tetlock’s recent work on the 
20  Kurt A Carlson and J Edward Russo, ‘Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock 
Jurors’ (2001) 7 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 91, 91. 
21  Further applications in Alvin I Goldman, ‘Quasi-objective Bayesianism and Legal 
Evidence’ (2002) 42 Jurimetics Journal 237. 
22  Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds) Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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errors of political ‘experts’23 — and indeed, that such errors are often 
resistant to training. On the other hand, the human brain, and for that 
matter the rat brain, is good at evaluating risks in many circumstances 
— otherwise there would not be any brains left — and five-year-olds 
and laboratory rats can often make the right decision on the basis of 
relative frequencies.24
What does ‘right’ mean, when we ask ‘are evaluators getting it 
right?’ The Bayesian perspective has an answer. It says, for example, 
that if one observes a consequence of a theory, one is correct in 
believing the theory more than before (not less), and that if the great 
majority of a pundit’s predictions have proved false, it would be unwise 
to believe the next one. Other perspectives on evidence, for example 
sociological or frequentist ones, have tended to eschew 
pronouncements on what is objectively right, but it is impossible to 
avoid doing so when undertaking serious research on errors of 
judgment. Yet the concept of ‘error of judgment’ is clear enough in this 
research — for example, a misperception of risk on the basis of past 
evidence that will lead to dangerous decisions — so the credentials of 
the research are sound. 
 
VI Case Study: Quantifying the ‘Proof Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt’ Standard 
Should there be an effort to quantify in any way, perhaps with an 
imprecise number, the ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of 
criminal law? 
Suppose the judge in a criminal trial has directed the jury 
correctly on the need for it to reach ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ or 
some equivalent formulation. If the jury foreman returns during the 
jury’s deliberation and asks the judge, ‘Is 60 per cent okay?” the judge 
has a choice of three possible answers: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘I am not going 
to tell you’. The latter answer is normally regarded as legally 
appropriate.25
                                                        
23  Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? 
(Princeton University Press, 2005). 
 Nevertheless it is a problematic answer, since if the jury, 
lacking any assistance from the judge, were to convict on what it took 
to be a probability of guilt of 60 per cent, it would seem to have 
departed substantially from the normal and plain meaning of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ and to have perpetrated an injustice. 
24  Vittorio Girotto and Michel Gonzalez, ‘Children’s Understanding of Posterior 
Probability’ (2008) 106 Cognition 325; John H Holland et al, Induction (MIT Press, 
1986) [5.2].  
25 Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1983) 
114. 
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There are a number of objections to any quantification of the 
standard (over and above any distaste for numbers as such that may be 
endemic in the legal profession due to, for example, the lack of 
statistics courses in law degrees). The Bayesian perspective introduces 
clarity into the debate about these objections by making a clear 
distinction between objections based on ethical or policy considerations 
and objections based on conceptual problems about probability. 
From the direction of policy, ethics and psychology, the 
problems raised include: 
• There may be different standards appropriate to 
different cases, for example a higher standard where 
the punishment is heavier; 
• The jury is properly left to decide the standard in the 
light of the facts of the particular case; 
• Since there is in fact considerable disagreement as to 
the correct numerical value of the standard, attempts to 
standardise it will create only confusion, evasions and a 
façade of uniformity where there is no true consensus; 
and 
• The majesty of the law and its powers of deterrence 
would be ill-served if the law were forced to admit the 
truth about the number of false convictions it allows 
and the number of criminals it allows to go free. 
Quite different objections arise from certain, more conceptual, 
problems about the nature of probability: 
• Some probabilities may be inherently incapable of 
being given a precise number; 
• Evidence suitable for conviction should be ‘substantial’ 
or ‘weighty’, and a numerical probability expresses 
only the balance between favourable and unfavourable 
reasons, not whether those reasons are substantial; and 
• A numerical standard will tend to draw attention to 
evidence that is quantified and logically relevant but 
legally inadmissible, such as proportions in reference 
classes containing the defendant.  
Those are all substantial reasons, though none have much force when 
it comes to allowing a jury to convict on a probability of 60 per cent 
if it sees fit.26                                                        
26  James Franklin, ‘Case comment: United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005): Quantification of the “Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt” Standard’ 
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VII Frequencies and the Proportional Syllogism 
While Bayesians do not insist that the relation of evidence to 
conclusion should always be numerical, they maintain that in many 
important cases there are indeed numbers expressing that relation. A 
paradigm is the probability assignment, sometimes called the 
‘proportional syllogism’27 or ‘statistical syllogism’28
P(Tex is rich | Tex is a Texan and 90% of Texans are rich) 
= 0.9 
 or argument 
from frequencies, such as:  
Some care is needed at this point. It is initially natural to object: 
‘What if Tex were a philosopher? He’d hardly be likely to be rich 
then’. Of course that is true, but the number 0.9 is about the relation of 
the conclusion to the given body of evidence, ‘Tex is a Texan and 90 % 
of Texans are rich’, not to some other body of evidence, such as ‘Tex is 
a Texan and a philosopher and 90 % of Texans are rich.’ Bayesianism 
maintains that probability is a relation between evidence and 
conclusion — so, different bodies of evidence, different relation. This 
is what makes it hard to apply the Bayesian perspective in any 
mechanical way to the evaluation of real court cases where the jury 
should use as part of its evidence its general knowledge of the way the 
world is and how people normally behave. Formalising ‘the 
commonsense knowledge of the reasonable man’ is impossible — or at 
least the artificial intelligence community have been promising to do it 
for 50 years and have got almost nowhere, so it is not likely to be 
available on a CD Real Soon Now. 
VIII Legal Relevance of the Statistical Syllogism 
To say that the statistical syllogism is a good argument as a matter of 
logic is not to say that it is always a good argument as a matter of law 
(or of ethics). The problem is illustrated by Jonathan Cohen’s 
‘gatecrasher paradox’: Suppose 499 tickets to a rodeo have been sold, 
and 1000 persons are observed on the stands. If that is the sole 
evidence, is the rodeo owner entitled to judgment against each of the                                                                                                               
(2006) 5 Law, Probability and Risk 159; it is true that in cases of reverse burdens, 
there may be conviction on a lower probability, but such cases appear to deny that 
‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ is the appropriate standard rather than changing the 
meaning of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt; see David Hamer, ‘The Presumption of 
Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Act’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law 
Journal 142. 
27 Peter Forrest, The Dynamics of Belief (Blackwell, 1986) ch 8. 
28  Carl G Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (Free Press, 1965) ch 2; Merrilee 
H Salmon, Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking (Thomson Wadsworth, 3rd ed, 
1995) 99–100; William Gustason, Reasoning from Evidence: Inductive Logic 
(Macmillan, 1994) 49–51. 
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attendees for the cost of admission on the basis of this statistical 
syllogism?: 
501 of the 1000 attendees are gatecrashers 
A is an attendee 
Therefore, on the balance of probabilities, A is a 
gatecrasher29
The normal legal answer is ‘no’. The analysis of such cases has 
been much debated. One possibility is that the law regards it as unfair 
to individuals to reach decisions solely on the basis of statistical 
evidence, and requires that there should be at least some evidence that 
somehow bears directly on, or is caused by, the individual case — is 
‘case-specific’.
 
30 If that or something similar is the correct analysis, it 
simply means that the argument is correct as a matter of probabilistic 
inference, but the law chooses to require more for the sake of justice. 
Which, of course, it is free to do since the purposes of the law of 
evidence, like any other part of the law, include non-epistemic ones 
such as the respecting of rights and justice, as well as the epistemic one 
of reaching the probable truth.31
It is somewhat better established that the rule of exclusion of 
similar fact evidence in criminal trials is a matter of policy or justice 
rather than of probability. The argument: 
 
The accused has committed several robberies 
The crime at hand is a robbery 
Therefore, the accused is more likely than a random 
person to have committed it  
is admitted to be probative as a matter of logic, and its exclusion is 
based on a moral consideration about its potential to unreasonably 
influence the jury to the prejudice of the defendant. Similar fact 
evidence is generally considered to be admissible ‘provided it 
possesses sufficient probative value to outweigh the risk of 
                                                        
29 L Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (Clarendon Press, 1977) 74; 
David Kaye, ‘The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories’ [1979] Arizona 
State Law Journal 101; Stephen E. Fienberg, ‘Gatecrashers, Blue Buses and the 
Bayesian Representation of Legal Evidence’ (1986) 66 Boston University Law 
Review 693. 
30 Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford University Press, 2005) 70–2, 79; 
William L Twining and Alex Stein (eds), Evidence and Proof (New York University 
Press, 1992) xxi–xxiv; the difficulties of explaining the matter in non-ethical, purely 
decision-theoretic terms are exemplified in Daniel Shaviro, ‘Statistical-probability 
Evidence and the Appearance of Justice’ (1989) 103 Harvard Law Review 530. 
31 Hock Lai Ho, A Philosophy Of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth 
(Oxford University Press, 2008). 
2011]  OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN CONCEPTUALISATION OF PROOF 557 
prejudice’32
IX Reference Class Problems 
 — a saying that makes little sense without a robustly 
objectivist view of the probabilities involved in both ‘probative value’ 
and ‘risk of prejudice’. 
Legal theorists have had to consider the proportional syllogism 
because of the natural occurrence of what has come to be called in 
law and philosophy the ‘reference class problem’. It is all very well to 
argue 
P(Tex is rich | Tex is a Texan and 90% of Texans are rich) 
= 0.9 
But what if Tex is a member of several classes, with differing 
frequencies of wealth? Suppose the evidence is 
Tex is a Texan philosopher and 90% of Texans are rich 
and 10% of philosophers are rich33
What should one then think about the probability of Tex being 
rich? 
 
In general, as Venn pointed out in the nineteenth century, ‘It is 
obvious that every individual thing or event has an indefinite number of 
properties or attributes observable in it, and might therefore be 
considered as belonging to an indefinite number of different classes of 
things’, leading to a general problem as to how to assign probabilities 
to a single case on the basis of frequencies, for example the probability 
that John Smith, a consumptive Englishman aged 50, will live to 61.34
Reichenbach gave the name ‘reference class problem’, arguing: 
 
If we are asked to find the probability holding for an 
individual future event, we must first incorporate the event 
into a suitable reference class. An individual thing or 
event may be incorporated in many reference classes, 
from which different probabilities will result. This 
ambiguity has been called the problem of the reference 
class.35
Plainly, the problem will appear in any case where there may be 
doubt as to what class containing an instance is most relevant to 
determining its probability of having some attribute. Philosophers, as is 
 
                                                        
32 Eg, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 97, 101; David Hamer, ‘Similar Fact Reasoning in 
Phillips: Artificial, Disjointed and Pernicious’ (2007) 30 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 609. 
33  Example from Stephen F Barker, Induction and Hypothesis (Cornell University 
Press, 1957) 76. 
34  John Venn, The Logic of Chance (MacMillan 1866) 176. 
35 Hans Reichenbach, The Theory of Probability (University of California Press, 1949) 
374. 
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their way, have written at length on the ubiquity and difficulty of the 
problem, without offering a solution.36 Artificial intelligence 
researchers on commonsense reasoning have also come across the 
problem, and they too have found it intractable.37
In law, it has come to be appreciated that any case involving 
statistical evidence could be infected by reference class problems, 
leading to potentially endless argument between counsel on the 
relevance of different classes that include the case at hand.
 
38
The vast majority of innocent people do not match the 
perpetrator (in DNA or whatever characteristic has been 
identified) 
 The 
‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ is in the first instance a reference class problem 
(though there is more to the fallacy than that). The prosecutor invites 
the jury to consider the proportional syllogism: 
So the defendant, if innocent, would very probably not 
match the perpetrator (hence, as he does match the 
perpetrator, he is probably not innocent)39
A defence against this fallacy involves looking at another 
reference class, that of all persons matching the perpetrator. In that 
class, the proportion of innocent people may not be low. Base rate 
fallacies more generally involve neglect of proportions in a reference 
class that is in fact relevant to the problem and needs to be combined 
with more specific information.
 
40




                                                        
36 Henry E Kyburg, ‘The Reference Class’ (1983) 50 Philosophy of Science 374; Alan 
Hájek, ‘The Reference Class Problem Is Your Problem Too’ (2007) 156 Synthese 
563; Mark Colyvan, Helen M Regan and Scott Ferson, ‘Is it a Crime to Belong to a 
Reference Class?’ (2001) 9 Journal of Political Philosophy 168. 
 sentencing guidelines required an estimate of how 
much heroin Charles Shonubi, a Nigerian drug smuggler, had carried 
through New York’s John F Kennedy Airport (‘JFK’) on seven 
previous trips during which he had been undetected. The estimate was 
37 Raymond Reiter and Giovanni Criscuolo, ‘On Interacting Defaults’, Proceedings of 
the 7th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (1981) 270. 
38 See articles in ‘Special Issue on The Reference Class Problem’ (2007) 11 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 242. 
39  The problem is often put in terms of conditional probabilities: P(match|innocent) is 
low, which does not imply that P(innocent|match) is low. That is essentially 
equivalent to the above, since P(match|innocent) is low because of the low 
proportion of matches in the class of innocents, that is, ‘The vast majority of 
innocents do not match’; while P(innocent|match) refers to the proportion of 
innocents in the class of matchers, which may not be low. 
40  Maya Bar-Hillel, ‘The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments’ (1980) 44 Acta 
Psychologica 211. 
41  895 F Supp 460 (EDNY 1995), discussed in Peter Tillers, ‘If Wishes Were Horses: 
Discursive Comments on Attempts to Prevent Individuals from Being Unfairly 
Burdened by Their Reference Classes’ (2005) 4 Law, Probability & Risk 33. 
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based on the average amounts of heroin found on Nigerian drug 
smugglers caught at JFK airport in the time period. Why should that be 
used as the reference class relevant to the case rather than, say, George 
Washington Bridge tollbooth collectors (Shonubi’s day job)? Or, take a 
more typical case involving valuation: Valuing a house for sale 
involves estimating its price from the sale records for ‘similar’ houses. 
No other house is exactly similar to the given one, so how widely or 
narrowly should one choose the reference class of ‘similar’ houses, and 
on what criteria? Number of bathrooms? Age? Street number? 
Ethnicity of owner? 
X Solution to the Reference Class Problem 
There is some consensus that the reference class problem is inherently 
unsolvable; that ‘there is no principled way to establish the relevance 
of a reference class’.42
The solution is, in principle, straightforward. In summary: 
 That is hard to believe. Human life, and for 
that matter animal life, requires continual judgments of risk on the 
basis of frequencies — the risk of lions behind rocks, of being 
waylaid on the way to the shops, of rejection of tenure, and so on. To 
stay alive and in the game, one must evaluate a good proportion of 
risks well, which is impossible if one cannot distinguish the few 
relevant reference classes from the many irrelevant ones. We solve 
reference class problems every day. Surely it is possible to say how. 
• A reference class is defined by its features (for 
example, the houses in Centreville of a given age and 
number of bathrooms), so the problem reduces to 
explaining the relevance of features; 
• For statistical evidence, relevance is co-variation: a 
feature A (such as ‘age’) is relevant to a prediction B 
(such as ‘value’) if A and B co-vary (or are correlated); 
and 
• The ideal reference class for an outcome B is the class 
defined by the intersection of all the features relevant to 
B. 
To clarify: One must distinguish between a set or class — the actual 
members, such as houses — and the features defining it such as 
‘houses in Centreville, 30 years old with two bathrooms’. It is the 
members of the class that must be counted but it is the defining 
features that are or are not relevant to prediction.                                                         
42 Mark Colyvan and Helen M Regan, ‘Legal Decisions and the Reference Class 
Problem’ (2007) 11 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 274, 275. 
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The essential idea of the solution is that the relevance of one 
feature to the prediction of another is defined by co-variation, that is, 
the ‘ons’ of one feature by and large go with the ‘ons’ of the other. 
Why is the colour of traffic lights relevant to the decision to drive 
across the intersection? Because when the light is green it is safe to 
drive and when it is red it is not safe (almost always).43
The usual measure of co-variation of two features is the 
correlation coefficient. That is what is normally used in the area of 
recent statistics where deciding on the relevance of features has been 
most intensively studied, the process called ‘feature selection’ in data 
mining, also known as ‘variable selection’ or ‘attribute selection;.
 That is, colour 
of traffic light co-varies with safety of driving across the intersection. 
But the colour of the car ahead does not co-vary with safety, so there is 
no point in attending to that feature when deciding whether to drive 
across the intersection. 
44
                                                        
43 Ronald K Templeton and James Franklin, ‘Adaptive Information and Animal 
Behaviour: Why Motorists Stop at Red Traffic Lights’ (1992) 10 Evolutionary 
Theory 145. 
 A 
database is organised into many rows (the cases) and columns (the 
fields, attributes, properties, or features of the cases). Data mining deals 
with very large databases: hundreds of rows for real estate but millions 
for many kinds of health and gene data and financial records, with 
possibly thousands of features (columns). In such large cases, the great 
majority of features are expected to be irrelevant to the task of 
prediction. For example, not every feature or measurement in a gene 
database will be helpful in predicting cancer, and most features of 
financial records will be irrelevant to determining creditworthiness. The 
more features in a database, the harder it is to evaluate each feature’s 
relevance. The aim of feature selection methods is to determine from 
large amounts of data which of the many properties or features of the 
individual cases are relevant to a given classification or prediction task. 
A feature is relevant if it gives some information about the outcome — 
for example, ‘number of bathrooms’ makes some difference to ‘house 
price’ in the sense that, on average, a different number of bathrooms 
goes with a different house price. Relevance is correlation. There is a 
standard definition of correlation and there are some alternative 
44 See generally Avrim L Blum and Pat Langley, ‘Selection of Relevant Features and 
Examples in Machine Learning’ (1997) 97 Artificial Intelligence 245; Isabelle 
Guyon and André Elisseeff, ‘An Introduction to Variable and Feature Selection’ 
(2003) 3 Journal of Machine Learning Research 1157; Mark A Hall and Geoffrey 
Holmes, ‘Benchmarking Attribute Selection Techniques for Discrete Class Data 
Mining’ (2003) 15 IEEE Transactions on Knowledge & Data Engineering 1437; 
Patricia E N Lutu and Andries P Engelbrecht, ‘A Decision Rule-Based Method for 
Feature Selection in Predictive Data Mining’ (2010) 37 Expert Systems with 
Applications 602. 
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measures of association to choose from, but they are all intended to 
measure the degree to which one variable ‘goes with’ another.45
Once the relevant features for a prediction (such as house price) 
have been identified, it is clear what the relevant reference class for a 
case is. It is the class of items that agree with the case in all relevant 
features.
 
46 If being Nigerian, being a drug mule, being at JFK, and 
being in the time period are all reasonably believed to be relevant to the 
amount of drugs smuggled, and there is no evidence that any other 
feature on which data is available is relevant, then the ideal choice of 
reference class for Mr Shonubi is the class of Nigerian drug smugglers 
at JFK in the time period.47
There is a potential problem with this ideal choice of reference 
class: maybe the set defined by the intersection of all relevant features is 
too small to be usable. It is usable if there is a sufficiently large number 
of cases in it for a reliable estimate of the target. A data set that is too 
small, or perhaps contains only the single original case, will not support 
reliable estimates since there is too much chance involved in which few 
cases happened to land in the set.
 
48 To know whether the data is enough 
to ensure reliability of the estimate, one consults standard statistical 
theory on the variance or standard deviation of the estimate in question.49
If the ideal choice of reference class is too small for reliable 
inference, one must use larger classes defined by some of the attributes 
and ‘trade off’ the results of each. That is a difficult problem, typified by 




                                                        
45 Further in James Franklin, ‘Feature Selection Methods for Solving the Reference 
Class Problem: Comment on Edward K Cheng, “A Practical Solution to the 
Reference Class Problem”’ (2010) 110 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 12. 
 
46 ‘Relevance’ of features briefly suggested in Gustason, above n 29, 50. 
47 The reasonable belief on the relevance of those features could be based on explicit 
counts of data in a database, but it could also be based on general knowledge gained 
through normal experience of life; such prior beliefs can be subject to normal cross-
examination in court. 
48 Reichenbach said when coining the phrase ‘reference class problem’ that it should be 
‘the narrowest class for which reliable statistics can be compiled’, which is correct 
when such a class can be defined, except that one does not narrow a relevant 
reference class by splitting it according to irrelevant attributes. Reichenbach, above n 
36; other problems for Reichenbach’s solution in Hájek, above n 37, 156. 
49 See also Franklin, above n 46. 
50 Ibid. 
